On an argument in defense of emergent substance dualism (an objection to Martine Nida-Rümelin)
D. Razeev
Philosophy Journal 2020 DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2020-13-3-150-161 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Nida-Rümelin's case for emergent substance dualism faces two conceptual problems: its first premise leaves unclear whether the organism as a material system is identical to the body, and its account of subject causation requires rejecting the causal closure of the physical, costing the argument one of its supports. |
Abstract
The paper deals with Martine Nida-Rümelin’s argument in defense of emergent substance dualism developed in her recent papers. The author reconstructs and critically considers the central claims of the argument: 1. The emergence of new Individuals, 2. The emergence of Consciousness Properties, 3. Qualitatively New Properties, 4. Subject Causation, and 5. The causal Powers of Consciousness Properties. The author raises two conceptual objections against the argument developed by Nida-Rümelin. The first objection is targets the first premise of the argument and is related to the conceptual ambiguity of the mechanism of formation of body experience, in particular, the argument does not ex-plain whether the organism as a material system is identical to the body. The second objection concerns the fourth and fifth premises of the argument and is related to the principle of the subject causation. The author shows that Nida-Rümelin’s assumption works re-quires a rejection of another important principle, namely the principle of the causal close-ness of the physical. This deprives the argument of one of its