“Language barrier” in theories of mind and limitations of the computational approach

Computational models in philosophy of mind and empirical science face fundamental limitations that prevent them from correctly addressing the ontology of consciousness. The conceptual level of computational approaches cannot formulate questions about consciousness's nature, despite their empirical success. Computationalism in philosophical theories of consciousness is a practice of word usage that describes information properties of consciousness within methodological rules. Limitations include the lack of a scientific theory of subjectivity, irreducibility of external properties of consciousness to internal states, and fundamental restrictions from computer mathematics on completeness and consistency. The paper classifies anti-computational programs and discusses difficulties formalizing nonlinear processes, predicting emergent properties of autonomous systems, and limitations from non-standard computational processes. Set-theoretic reductive realism and p-adic number systems are considered as possible alternatives.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This paper examines from a special perspective the problem of methodological limita­tions of the computational approach in the philosophy of mind and empirical sciences. The main goal is to consistently substantiate the dependence of philosophical “metaphori­cal dictionaries” on advances in the field of computer science, historical contexts of epis­temology, formal and methodological limitations of algorithmic and computational proce­dures. The key idea is that despite the success of computational models in empirical re­search, their conceptual level does not allow us to correctly formulate the question of the ontology of consciousness. Computationalism in philosophical theories of con­sciousness is presented as a practice of word usage, which posits systems of consistent descriptions of the information properties of consciousness and cognitive processes within the framework of certain methodological rules. The limitations of the computa­tional approach are associated with the lack of a scientific theory of subjectivity, the fun­damental irreducibility of external properties of consciousness to internal states, and fun­damental restrictions on the completeness and consistency of computer mathematics. A classification of several anti-computational programs has been carried out. The article discusses various limitations of computational approaches, such as: the complexity of for­malizing nonlinear and hidden processes, the dependence of emotions and intuition on the situational context and individual differences, the difficulty of predicting the emerg­ing properties of autonomous and autopoietic systems, and the limitations associated with non-standard computational processes of quantum and dynamic phenomena. A special role is given to the problem of set-theoretic reductive realism within the framework of mathe­matical structuralism and some aspects of p-adic number systems as a possible alternative to a “universal language” for the computational philosophy of consciousness.