The science of consciousness: in search of a paradigm?

The science of consciousness should not pursue a single grand unified theory, as theoretical monism is inappropriate for both cognitive science and consciousness studies. Instead, the optimal explanatory strategy depends on the subject matter: cognitive science benefits from explanatory pluralism, while consciousness studies may require a unified approach. In the absence of theories that predict novel phenomena or explain known facts unexpectedly, empirical adequacy—not falsifiability—should be the primary criterion for assessing theories like computational models. Falsifiability remains a useful methodological principle but not a demarcation criterion or cure-all.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This article considers some important methodological questions related to the develop­ment of modern science of consciousness: the question of a search for a grand unified theory, determining an optimal explanatory strategy, virtues of computational theories of consciousness. The author draws on the fact of close interaction between the modern consciousness studies and cognitive sciences. Linking the idea of a grand unified theory to the image of paradigm elaborated by Kuhn, the author argues against theoretical monism in both the cognitive sciences and the science of consciousness. It is further ar­gued that choice of an optimal explanatory strategy in both the cognitive sciences and consciousness studies should be determined by the character of the subject matter itself. While in the case of the cognitive sciences the evidence speaks in favor of explanatory pluralism, the science of consciousness may indeed require a unified explanatory strategy. It is asserted that in the absence of breakthroughs in predicting novel empirical phenom­ena or unintended explanations of known facts, etc., the criterion of empirical adequacy should play the key role in theory assessment. Thus, currently, computational and other theories of consciousness should be primarily judged by their empirical adequacy and not by their potential falsifiability. The latter should be understood as a methodological regu­lative principle, but not as a panacea for improving theories or a demarcation criterion.