Journal of Vision
June 26, 2015
Yair Pinto, Simon van Gaal, Floris P De Lange et al.
177 citations
Expectations speed up conscious perception. In four experiments using predictive cueing and continuous flash suppression, expected images entered awareness faster than neutral or unexpected ones. This effect was not due to response priming, stimulus associations, or attentional timing biases. Top-down expectations had a stronger influence when visual input was ambiguous, consistent with predictive processing accounts. The findings support the idea that conscious access depends on verifying perceptual predictions.
PLoS One
February 10, 2023
Lucia Melloni, Liad Mudrik, Michael Pitts et al.
106 citations
An adversarial collaboration between proponents of Global Neuronal Workspace and Integrated Information Theory devised and preregistered two experiments that test contrasting predictions about the location and timing of correlates of visual consciousness. Six theory-impartial laboratories will follow the study protocol using fMRI, M-EEG, and intracranial EEG, with built-in replications between labs and within datasets. The project aims to provide decisive evidence for or against the two theories and clarify the neural footprints of conscious visual perception, while modeling large-scale, collaborative, and open science practice.
Nature
June 1, 2025
Oscar Ferrante, Urszula Gorska-Klimowska, Simon Henin et al.
94 citations
Different theories explain how subjective experience arises from brain activity. An open science adversarial collaboration directly juxtaposed integrated information theory (IIT) and global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT). Human participants (n = 256) viewed suprathreshold stimuli for variable durations while neural activity was measured with fMRI, MEG, and intracranial EEG. Information about conscious content was found in visual, ventrotemporal, and inferior frontal cortex, with sustained responses in occipital and lateral temporal cortex reflecting stimulus duration, and content-specific synchronization between frontal and early visual areas. These results align with some predictions of IIT and GNWT but substantially challenge key tenets of both theories, including a lack of sustained posterior cortex synchronization for IIT and a lack of ignition at stimulus offset and limited prefrontal representation for GNWT.
Scientific Data
May 7, 2026
Aya Khalaf, David Richter, Yamil Vidal et al.
An adversarial collaboration between proponents of the Global Neuronal Workspace theory and the Integrated Information Theory of consciousness produced a functional magnetic resonance imaging dataset from 118 participants. Participants viewed faces, objects, letters, and false fonts presented at three orientations and three durations (0.5, 1.0, 1.5 seconds) while identifying infrequent targets. Two categories were task-relevant and two were task-irrelevant in each block. The simple design makes the data broadly reusable for testing predictions from other theories of consciousness and for examining visual processing. Anonymized data, quality reports, demographics, behavioral performance, and eye-tracking data are publicly accessible.
bioRxiv Preprint Server
June 23, 2023
Oscar Ferrante, Urszula Gorska-Klimowska, Simon Henin et al.
preprint
An open science adversarial collaboration directly juxtaposed Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT) by investigating neural correlates of visual experience. 256 human subjects viewed suprathreshold stimuli for variable durations while neural activity was measured with fMRI, MEG, and ECoG. Information about conscious content was found in visual, ventro-temporal, and inferior frontal cortex, with sustained responses in occipital and lateral temporal cortex reflecting stimulus duration, and content-specific synchronization between frontal and early visual areas.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2019
Erik L Meijs, Pim Mostert, Heleen A. Slagter et al.
Expectations about an upcoming stimulus increase the likelihood of conscious report, but this enhancement does not occur by sharpening sensory neural representations. Using magnetoencephalography and an attentional blink paradigm, researchers decoded letter identity from neural activity. Early sensory representations were similar whether letters were reported or missed, and also when letter identity was task-irrelevant. Later sustained neural representations were uniquely present when letters were consciously reported, indicating a decision-dependent signal. Global pre-stimulus neural activity biased decisions toward 'seen' responses. No evidence supported the sharpening of sensory representations by top-down expectations.