This chapter addresses perceptual consciousness beyond vision. An impressive reach of human perceptual consciousness is non-visual. From this perspective, it is odd that philosophers have so persistently focused on visual forms at the expense of others. This oversight has potential costs. Nothing guarantees that claims about perceptual consciousness or its phenomenology founded on vision alone...
Abstract Perceptual capacities need not be reflected as such in perceptual consciousness. Thus, a subject could possess multisensory perceptual capacities while perceptual consciousness remains sense specific. For instance, a subject could detect and differentiate novel intermodal features without corresponding, irreducibly multisensory perceptual awareness. In response, this chapter argues...
Abstract This chapter argues that perceptual experience is richly multisensory. In particular, phenomenal consciousness is constitutively and irreducibly multisensory. The reason is that the phenomenal character of a conscious multisensory episode can include more than what is associated with each of the respective senses plus whatever accrues due to simple co-consciousness. Exercising...