4 papers in the library · 23 citations · publishing 2018-2026
Behavioral and Brain Sciences September 17, 2026 Manuel Baltieri, Ryota Kanai
Seth's biological naturalism builds on ideas from predictive processing, the free energy principle, and active inference to (1) argue that only (some) biological systems are in the consciousness business and to (2) refute the possibility of artificial consciousness, i.e., consciousness in AI and other artificial systems. We find this perspective problematic for a few different reasons.
PsyArXiv October 24, 2025 Ryota Kanai, Yuwei Sun, Manuel Baltieri preprint
Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have reignited questions about whether artificial systems possess consciousness. Yet, despite remarkable progress in reasoning and language understanding, current AI systems exist only within isolated episodes of computation. This paper argues that a missing ingredient in such systems is temporal continuity, i.e., the persistence of internal...
arXiv Preprint Archive March 22, 2019 Manuel Baltieri, Christopher L. Buckley preprint
In psychology and neuroscience it is common to describe cognitive systems as input/output devices where perceptual and motor functions are implemented in a purely feedforward, open-loop fashion. On this view, perception and action are often seen as encapsulated modules with limited interaction between them. While embodied and enactive approaches to cognitive science have challenged the...
arXiv (Cornell University) June 7, 2018 Manuel Baltieri, Christopher L. Buckley 23 citations preprint
The assumption that action and perception can be investigated independently is entrenched in theories, models and experimental approaches across the brain and mind sciences. In cognitive science, this has been a central point of contention between computationalist and 4Es (enactive, embodied, extended and embedded) theories of cognition, with the former embracing the "classical sandwich",...