On What Makes Certain Dynamical Systems Cognitive: A Minimally Cognitive Organization Program
Xabier E. Barandiaran, Álvaro Moreno
Adaptive Behavior June 1, 2006 DOI: 10.1177/105971230601400208 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractCognition is defined as adaptive-autonomy in embodied and situated neurodynamics, where a web of stability dependencies between sensorimotor structures is created and preserved through historical or developmental processes. The authors argue that dynamicism has helped explain how cognitive agents work but has not addressed what makes something cognitive, and the former cannot be complete without the latter. They criticize behavioristic characterizations in favor of an organizational approach focused on internal dynamic relationships. Emotional embodiment plays a functional role: internal bioregulatory processes couple to the formation and adaptive regulation of neurodynamic autonomy. A minimally cognitive behavior program in evolutionary simulation modeling is discussed, suggesting a complementary minimally cognitive organization program is needed.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Embodied cognition Cognitive science Cognitive robotics Autonomy Process computing |
| Citations | 131 |
| Key finding | Argues that cognition is best defined as adaptive-autonomy in the embodied and situated neurodynamic domain, emphasizing organizational rather than behavioristic criteria. |
Abstract
Dynamicism has provided cognitive science with important tools to understand some aspects of “how cognitive agents work” but the issue of “what makes something cognitive” has not been sufficiently addressed yet and, we argue, the former will never be complete without the latter. Behavioristic characterizations of cognitive properties are criticized in favor of an organizational approach focused on the internal dynamic relationships that constitute cognitive systems. A definition of cognition as adaptive-autonomy in the embodied and situated neurodynamic domain is provided: the compensatory regulation of a web of stability dependencies between sensorimotor structures is created and pre served during a historical/developmental process. We highlight the functional role of emotional embodiment: internal bioregulatory processes coupled to the formation and adaptive regulation of neurodynamic autonomy. Finally, we discuss a “minimally cognitive behavior program” in evolutionary simulation modeling suggesting that much is to be learned from a complementary “minimally cognitive organization program”