ABSTRACT The purpose of the paper is twofold. It first aims at clarifying and developing an important tension within enactivism concerning the relations between intentionality and content, once representationalism has been abandoned. In which sense(s) do enactivists (still) say that intentionality is contentful and not contentful? Secondly, it puts this tension in perspective with two...
Along some striking and real convergences, are there also relevant differences between Wittgenstein and 4E cognitive science? This paper answers positively to that question, by focusing upon the cognitive or psychological status of reading and understanding in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology and in enactivism. The main difference deals with the posited relations between reading,...
This paper tackles the problem of the nature of the space of perception. Based both on philosophical arguments and on results obtained from original experimental situations, it attempts to show how space is constituted concretely, before any distinction between the "inner" and the "outer" can be made. It thus sheds light on the presuppositions of the well-known debate between internalism and...