The structure of intentionality: insights and challenges for enactivism
Inquiry May 26, 2023 DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2023.2216753 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 5 |
| Key points | Argues that there is an unresolved tension within enactivism regarding the contentfulness of intentionality, and that this tension can be illuminated by comparing it with Husserl's and Peirce's accounts. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT The purpose of the paper is twofold. It first aims at clarifying and developing an important tension within enactivism concerning the relations between intentionality and content, once representationalism has been abandoned. In which sense(s) do enactivists (still) say that intentionality is contentful and not contentful? Secondly, it puts this tension in perspective with two paradigmatic ways of defining the relations between intentional states and their objects: Husserl’s theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations, and Charles Sanders Peirce’s triadic semiotics.