The structure of intentionality: insights and challenges for enactivism
Pierre Steiner
Inquiry May 26, 2023 DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2023.2216753 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 5 |
| Key points | Argues that there is an unresolved tension within enactivism regarding the contentfulness of intentionality, and that this tension can be illuminated by comparing it with Husserl's and Peirce's accounts. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT The purpose of the paper is twofold. It first aims at clarifying and developing an important tension within enactivism concerning the relations between intentionality and content, once representationalism has been abandoned. In which sense(s) do enactivists (still) say that intentionality is contentful and not contentful? Secondly, it puts this tension in perspective with two paradigmatic ways of defining the relations between intentional states and their objects: Husserl’s theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations, and Charles Sanders Peirce’s triadic semiotics.
Citations in the library
Cited by 2
- Gesture, meaning, and intentionality: from radical to pragmatist enactive theory of language Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences September 23, 2023
- From pure experience to cognitive models: constitutive explanations and modalization in phenomenological cognitivism Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences August 12, 2025
Cites 5
- Evolving Enactivism The MIT Press eBooks May 19, 2017
- Debunking enactivism: a critical notice of Hutto and Myin’s Radicalizing Enactivism Canadian Journal of Philosophy February 1, 2014
- Does Separating Intentionality From Mental Representation Imply Radical Enactivism? Frontiers in Psychology 2018
- Vision and Mind October 25, 2002
- The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience 1991