Reading and understanding: on some differences between Wittgenstein and 4E cognitive science
Pierre Steiner
Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 2018 DOI: 10.4396/508 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 6 |
| Key points | Argues that although Wittgenstein and enactivism share anti-representationalist, externalist, and anti-intellectualist commitments, they differ on reading and understanding: enactivism conceives cognition as supervenient on processes, whereas Wittgenstein holds that psychological phenomena relate to concomitant processes only through psychological concepts, behavioural criteria, and normative practices. |
Abstract
Along some striking and real convergences, are there also relevant differences between Wittgenstein and 4E cognitive science? This paper answers positively to that question, by focusing upon the cognitive or psychological status of reading and understanding in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology and in enactivism. The main difference deals with the posited relations between reading, understanding, and material processes. Despite its anti-representationalist, externalist and anti-intellectualist core, enactivism continues to conceive cognition as supervenient on processes, whereas for Wittgenstein, the relations between psychological phenomena and concomitant processes are mediated by psychological concepts, behavioural criteria and normative practices.