Abstract Recent advances in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) renewed the enthusiasm for what AIs can do. While some argue that AIs can be viable models for understanding human cognition, others go further and claim that future AIs might display cognitive capacities. However, although some current models excel at tasks such as language processing and pattern recognition, their...
The notion of atmosphere has taken prominence in contemporary architecture discourse, in which it is used mainly to denote the affective characteristic of inhabitable spaces. In this paper, we employ the ecological-enactive approach to cognition to explain how atmospheres are perceived and created. According to that approach, cognitive systems actively explore meaningful possibilities for...
We advance a critical examination of two recent branches of the enactivist research program, namely, Radically Enactive Cognition and Linguistic Bodies. We argue that, although these approaches may look like diverging views within the wider enactivist program, when appraised in a conciliatory spirit, they can be interpreted as developing converging ideas. We examine how the notion of know-how...
Information is a central notion for cognitive sciences and neurosciences, but there is no agreement on what it means for a cognitive system to acquire information about its surroundings. In this paper, we approximate three influential views on information: the one at play in ecological psychology, which is sometimes called information for action; the notion of information as covariance as...
ABSTRACT I propose a middle-ground between a perceptual model of self-knowledge, according to which the objects of self-awareness (one's beliefs, desires, intentions and so on) are accessed through some kind of causal mechanism, and a rationalist model, according to which self-knowledge is constituted by one's rational agency. Through an analogy with the role of the exercises of sensorimotor...
Primeiro, o enativismo é apresentado como a ideia de que a ação é constitutiva da cognição e é situado historicamente a partir da psicologia ecológica de Gibson. O enativismo radical (segundo o qual nem toda cognição é representacional) é então diferenciado de enativismo moderado (segundo o qual a cognição envolve representações orientadas-pela-ação). É feita uma defesa do enativismo radical...