Three models for what contemporary philosophy of mind can learn from Buddhist thought are assessed. Alan Wallace's model claims that meditation reveals a primordial consciousness from which both individual consciousness and the physical world emerge. Owen Flanagan's model accepts only Buddhist insights compatible with physicalism, focusing on moral psychology and spirituality. Evan Thompson's phenomenological approach offers a non-dualistic account dissolving the explanatory gap between mind and body. Each model faces significant challenges. A different model derived from the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna is proposed, showing potential to resolve challenges facing contemporary theories of consciousness.
This article examines the current viability of substance dualism, the view that the mind or person is a non-material substance. The best-known version, Cartesian dualism, has faced longstanding objections, but contemporary philosophers have developed new formulations. The author identifies three central claims shared by all forms of substance dualism, reviews recent arguments for these claims, and assesses how well different versions respond to traditional criticisms. Most contemporary forms still struggle with at least one of three major challenges: bundle theories of the self, the phenomenal concepts strategy, and concerns about explanatory simplicity.