The self is real because it is defined by the capacity to have experiences. The author argues that anti-realist critiques, such as those by Metzinger, target a strong notion of the self as a substantial, causally autonomous entity. Instead, a reductive realism is proposed: the self is an emergent property of other things, specifically the experiential faculty. Having experience is both necessary and sufficient for being a self. Other traits like self-awareness, moral agency, or autobiographical memory are contingent. A subject that loses experience ceases to be a subject, while non-human subjects with only experiential ability still qualify. The author endorses essentialist realism and rejects pluralism and conventionalism.
This article compares ontological strategies in Meister Eckhart's Christian Neoplatonic mysticism with those in Advaita Vedanta and Early Buddhism. Despite differences in anthropology, epistemology, and soteriology, all three traditions share similar approaches: detachment from images and forms as the highest blessing; disidentification from body, feelings, cognition, and reason; interiorizing consciousness and ending its representative function. Indian philosophies aim for liberation from suffering into bliss, paralleling Christian salvation through renouncing sin for unity with God. The apophatic Christian view of God as hidden, incomprehensible Nothingness, understood by detachment from the world and ego, enables this comparative analysis.