The author argues that the phenomenology of pre-reflective self-awareness supports the substance view of the self over deflationary or eliminativist theories. Drawing on accounts of pre-reflective self-awareness, mineness, and self-acquaintance, the paper contends that subjects are aware of themselves as the one individual who has many experiences, as the bearer and unifier of those experiences. This minimal self-awareness reveals the subject as present and known, giving reason to favor the substance view over the bundle or minimal self view. The argument demonstrates how debates on the phenomenology of self-awareness and the metaphysics of selfhood intersect.
The paper argues that philosophical accounts of mineness and pre-reflective self-awareness can help panpsychists address the combination problem. Many panpsychist theories adopt a deflationist view of the subject, reducing or eliminating subjects in favor of experiences, as seen in Parfit's reductionism of personal identity and G. Strawson's identity view. To evaluate deflation, one must understand what the subject or self is. The author contends that panpsychist theories have overlooked pre-reflective self-consciousness, a key aspect of consciousness. Phenomenologically inspired theories of the self, which take subjectivity seriously, can counter deflationary reductionism by showing that the subject of experience involves more than just its experiences or qualities. Even without a precise account of the self's nature, the phenomenology of subjective character and pre-reflective self-awareness contributes to the combination problem debate.