In this chapter, we discuss possible confounds that need to be carefully controlled for when the neural constitution of phenomenal conscious perception is studied. First, we discuss previous psychological or neural studies that clearly dissociated confounding factors (in particular, attention, report and memory) from phenomenal consciousness. We discuss several important phenomena and...
Accumulating evidence indicates that the capacity to integrate information in the brain is a prerequisite for consciousness. Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness provides a mathematical approach to quantifying the information integrated in a system, called integrated information, $Φ$. Integrated information is defined theoretically as the amount of information a system generates...
This joint article reflects the authors' personal views regarding noteworthy advances in the neuroscience of consciousness in the last 10 years, and suggests what we feel may be promising future directions. It is based on a small conference at the Samoset Resort in Rockport, Maine, USA, in July of 2012, organized by the Mind Science Foundation of San Antonio, Texas. Here, we summarize recent...
In 1593, Neapolitan polymath Giambattista della Porta publicly \nlamented that he was unable to improve his impressive productivity \n(he had published in areas as diverse as cryptography, \nhydraulics, pharmacology, optics, and classic fiction). Della \nPorta was trying to read two books simultaneously by placing \nboth volumes side-by-side, and using each eye independently. To \nhis great...
The brain's ability to handle sensory information is influenced by both selective attention and consciousness. There is no consensus on the exact relationship between these two processes and whether they are distinct. So far, no experiment has simultaneously manipulated both. We carried out a full factorial 2 x 2 study of the simultaneous influences of attention and consciousness (as assayed by...
Recent research has slowly corroded a belief that selective attention and consciousness are so tightly entangled that they cannot be individually examined. In this review, we summarize psychophysical and neurophysiological evidence for a dissociation between top-down attention and consciousness. The evidence includes recent findings that show subjects can attend to perceptually invisible...
Whether one person’s experience of “red” is equivalent to another’s has long been considered unanswerable. One promising approach to this fundamental question about consciousness is the intersubjective comparison of the similarity relations of sensory experiences, termed “qualia structures”. Conventional methods for comparing similarity relations largely sidestep the issue, assuming that...
When we look at something, we might feel we see a richly detailed external world, but if being asked, our reports are often limited. This discrepancy is one of the central questions in cognitive science. Despite its fundamental importance, philosophers and psychologists still do not agree on whether our “experience” is rich or sparse, depending on their stance on consciousness and associated...
Mediano et al. (1. Mediano 2022 TICS) separate out strong and weak flavours of the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. They describe “strong IIT” as attempting to derive a universal formula for consciousness, and “weak IIT” as searching for empirically measurable correlates of aspects of consciousness. We put forward that their overall notion of “weak IIT” may be too weak....
Dream experiences during sleep provide an excellent opportunity to investigate the neural basis of consciousness. Previous studies have examined the neural correlates of dreaming using electroencephalography (EEG), focusing on spectral power in specific frequency bands. However, findings have been inconsistent, particularly regarding the spatiotemporal characteristics of these correlates,...
Characterizing consciousness in and of itself is notoriously difficult. Any effort to define consciousness seems to evade what it tries to achieve. In particular, definitions often involve comparisons of different kinds of “consciousness” in a self-referential manner. The tautological nature of characterizing consciousness has led some scholars to propose that establishing a science of...
In our recent essay on Cognitive Science [Naotsugu Tsuchiya & Hayato Saigo (2019) “Understanding Consciousness Through Category Theory” vol 26, pp 462 - 477], we provided a general introduction of category theory to consciousness researchers. Further, we also provided our tentative theoretical sketches on our latest ideas on how to apply tools in category theory into consciousness research. In...
In their recent article, the unfolding argument, Doerig et al argue that a theory of consciousness cannot be based in the characterization of the physical structure of the brain. They argue that such theories must be “either false or outside the realm of science”. Instead, they prefer theories of consciousness based only on “input-output” descriptions. By their implicit treatment of phenomenal...
We spend a third of our lives asleep, and sleep teems with vivid dreams. While most people rarely remember their dreams, laboratory studies using timed awakenings show that healthy adults experience multiple dreams per night. Dreams have been hypothesised to play a key role in the development of consciousness and cognition1,2. Dreams are believed to contribute to sleep-related memory...