Commentary On Christopher Devlin Brown, The Hope and Horror of Physicalism: An Existential Treatise (Routledge, 2024)
Philosophia July 22, 2025 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-025-00883-0 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Review Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key findings | Argues that Devlin Brown's case for the existential relevance of physicalism is weaker than presented: the compatibility of metaphysical consolations with some version of physicalism does not establish their significance, existential optimism is not shown to be more mentally healthy than pessimism, and Brown's account of Russellian physicalism and its advantages over competing responses to the hard problem of consciousness is contested. |
Abstract
Devlin Brown takes on the weighty task of determining the existentially relevant consequences of physicalism. He delivers on this project over three parts that consider in turn: whether physicalism is compatible with various metaphysical consolations obtaining; whether the case for existential optimism defeats the case for existential pessimism; and whether there’s a version of physicalism we have good reason to believe. I challenge several of Devlin Brown’s claims. First, I challenge the import of his arguments that various existential consolations are consistent with at least one version of physicalism. Second, I challenge the claim that existential optimism is more mentally healthy than existential pessimism. Third, I challenge Devlin Brown’s characterisation of Russellian physicalism and its advantages over competing physicalist responses to the hard problem of consciousness.