A few decades ago, cognitive psychologists generally took for granted that the reason we perceive our visual environment as one contiguous stable whole (i.e., space constancy) is because we have an internal mental representation of the visual environment as one contiguous stable whole. They supposed that the non-contiguous visual images that are gathered during the brief fixations that...
This chapter explores the consequences of treating consciousness as a fuzzy dynamical system. A fuzzy dynamical system is one in which labeled concepts and percepts are altered as a function of context and conditions, and these changes occur continuously in time. We offer speculations on the groundwork for a consciousness state space in which the sets of trajectories over time form tube-like...
Embodied theories are increasingly challenging traditional views of cognition by arguing that conceptual representations that constitute our knowledge are grounded in sensory and motor experiences, and processed at this sensorimotor level, rather than being represented and processed abstractly in an amodal conceptual system. Given the established empirical foundation, and the relatively...