2 papers in the library · 20 citations · publishing 2017-2023
July 7, 2023 Davide Bordini 5 citations
Abstract Since the 1990s the so-called transparency of experience has played a crucial role in core debates in philosophy of mind. However, recent developments in the literature have made transparency itself quite opaque. The very idea of transparent experience has become quite fuzzy, due to the articulation of many different notions of transparency and transparency theses. Absent a unified...
Midwest Studies in Philosophy September 1, 2017 Davide Bordini 15 citations
According to intentionalism, the phenomenal character of experience is one and the same as the intentional content of experience (e.g., Dretske, 1995, 1996; Tye, 1995, 2000).This view has a problem with moods (anxiety, depression, elation, irritation, gloominess, grumpiness, etc.).Mood experiences certainly have phenomenal character, but do not exhibit directedness, i.e., do not appear...