The return of the soul hypothesis
Вестник Православного Свято-Тихоновского гуманитарного университета: Серия I. Богословие, философия November 20, 2025 Ivan Deviatko
The soul hypothesis remains a productive research program in philosophy of mind and analytic theology. Drawing on Rickabaugh and Moreland's 2024 monograph, the article argues that substantial dualism—the view that the self is an immaterial substance—can address the explanatory gap surrounding subjective consciousness better than materialism or panpsychism. It examines three dualist arguments: from introspection and privileged first-person knowledge, from the unity of consciousness explained by an immaterial soul, and from the logical possibility of existing without a body. The article proposes research avenues in non-physical psychology, phenomenology of spiritual practice, AI studies, bioethics, and the soul's spatio-temporal status. Rehabilitating the soul concept widens explanatory scope in philosophy of mind while strengthening analytic theology's resources for interdisciplinary debate about human nature.