The return of the soul hypothesis

The soul hypothesis remains a productive research program in philosophy of mind and analytic theology. Drawing on Rickabaugh and Moreland's 2024 monograph, the article argues that substantial dualism—the view that the self is an immaterial substance—can address the explanatory gap surrounding subjective consciousness better than materialism or panpsychism. It examines three dualist arguments: from introspection and privileged first-person knowledge, from the unity of consciousness explained by an immaterial soul, and from the logical possibility of existing without a body. The article proposes research avenues in non-physical psychology, phenomenology of spiritual practice, AI studies, bioethics, and the soul's spatio-temporal status. Rehabilitating the soul concept widens explanatory scope in philosophy of mind while strengthening analytic theology's resources for interdisciplinary debate about human nature.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This article explores the productive intersection between analytic theology and analytic philosophy of mind through the lens of Brandon Rickabaugh and J. P. Moreland’s 2024 monograph The Substance of Consciousness. Its aim is to show that the soul hypothesis is anything but an anachronism; rather, it opens research avenues capable of revitalising theories of consciousness while enriching Christian anthropology and apologetics. The opening section distinguishes AT from analytic philosophy of religion, emphasising that the former legitimately employs Scripture and Tradition as evidential premises, whereas the latter relies only on broadly philosophical intuitions and empirical data. The article then situates the debate within contemporary philosophy of mind, outlining the “explanatory gap” surrounding subjectivity and comparing the three main strategies—materialism, panpsychism, and dualism, with preference given to the last. The core analysis scrutinises Rickabaugh and Moreland’s defence of substantial dualism, focusing on: (1) an argument from introspection, insulated from the intensional fallacy by appeal to first-person privileged knowledge; (2) an account of the synchronic and diachronic unity of consciousness via modes of an immaterial soul; and (3) a revised Cartesian modal argument demonstrating the logical possibility of a self existing without a physical body. Special attention is devoted to Chapter 11, where the authors outline research programmes ranging from non-physical psychology and the phenomenology of spiritual practice to artificial-intelligence studies, bioethics, and the spatio-temporal status of the soul. The article concludes that rehabilitating the concept of the soul widens the explanatory scope of APM while reinforcing AT’s argumentative resources, placing the soul once more at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about human nature. Beyond purely theoretical results, the paper highlights the methodological value of dualist ideas for cognitive science and psychology. It thus offers both a snapshot of the current status of the soul hypothesis and a roadmap for future research aimed at clarifying the ontological standing of subjective experience.