Perceptual consciousness of the outside world always includes an inner awareness of that very mental state. This thesis is defended against philosopher Rocco Gennaro, who argued that outer-directed conscious states lack such inner awareness, opposing Uriah Kriegel's self-representationalist view. The authors critically examine Gennaro's arguments and present their own reasoning to show why denying inner awareness is mistaken.
Two versions of the higher-order thought theory of consciousness—Rosenthal's extrinsic model and Gennaro's intrinsic model—fail to explain the subjective character of conscious mental states. Both theories account for consciousness by positing a representational relation between two unconscious mental states: a higher-order thought and a lower-order target state. This two-tiered structure makes subjective character appear to shift from the target state to the higher-order thought, rather than being intrinsic to the conscious state itself. The objection is strongest against Rosenthal's theory, which clearly separates the world-directed state from the higher-order thought. Gennaro's intrinsic theory attempts to preserve intrinsic consciousness but still faces the shifting subjectivity problem in cases of introspection.