In this paper, I will delve into Evan Thompson’s analysis of dream experiences, which has challenged philosophers and scholars in the past. Many thinkers argue that dreams are not conscious experiences; there is an opposite view in which philosophers still argue for dreams as conscious phenomena. The paper primarily focuses on the hypothesis: ‘Thompson’s explication of dreams as conscious...
The present paper is concerned with a qualitative, analytical, and comparative method of exploring Buddhist perspectives on phenomenal consciousness. The phenomenal consciousness sciences have offered a mechanical explanation of the ‘how’ and ‘what’ of consciousness, but have failed to explain the ‘why’ of consciousness. The Buddhists have given a systematic explanation of conscious experience...
In this paper, we argue that the two versions of the higher–order thought theory of consciousness, viz. Rosenthal’s extrinsic higher–order thought and Gennaro’s intrinsic higher–order thought, fail to explain the subjective character of a conscious mental state. Both these theories face what we call the problem of shifting subjectivity. Since these theories explain the consciousness of mental...