Buddhist philosophy offers a systematic account of phenomenal consciousness through the scheme of the five aggregates (Pancha-skandha), where consciousness arises only in dependence on physical and mental factors. This conditioned, interdependent relationship between consciousness and mind-body (nama-rupa) means there is an unbroken series of consciousnesses without any arising without conditions. The paper argues that this Buddhist perspective not only challenges the possibility of a complete scientific explanation of phenomenal conscious experience but also provides philosophical grounds for affirming the existence of such experience.
Dreams are conscious experiences with an independent status during sleep, according to Evan Thompson's analysis. Philosophers Norman Malcolm and Daniel Dennett have argued that dreams lack conscious awareness, but Thompson criticizes their standpoint and defends dreams as conscious phenomena. This paper examines Thompson's explication of dream consciousness, emphasizing its metaphysical and ontological bases, and discusses limitations of his analysis. A tripartite model of the dynamic nature of the dreaming mind is proposed.
Two versions of the higher-order thought theory of consciousness—Rosenthal's extrinsic model and Gennaro's intrinsic model—fail to explain the subjective character of conscious mental states. Both theories account for consciousness by positing a representational relation between two unconscious mental states: a higher-order thought and a lower-order target state. This two-tiered structure makes subjective character appear to shift from the target state to the higher-order thought, rather than being intrinsic to the conscious state itself. The objection is strongest against Rosenthal's theory, which clearly separates the world-directed state from the higher-order thought. Gennaro's intrinsic theory attempts to preserve intrinsic consciousness but still faces the shifting subjectivity problem in cases of introspection.