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Sara I. Walker

4 papers in the library · publishing 2019-2023

Papers

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On the non-uniqueness problem in integrated information theory.

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2023 Jake R. Hanson, Sara I. Walker

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 3.0 is among the leading theories of consciousness in contemporary neuroscience. The core of the theory relies on the calculation of a scalar mathematical measure of consciousness, Φ, which is inspired by the phenomenological axioms of the theory. Here, we show that despite its widespread application, Φ is not a well-defined mathematical concept in the sense...

Formalizing falsification for theories of consciousness across computational hierarchies.

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2021 Jake R. Hanson, Sara I. Walker

The scientific study of consciousness is currently undergoing a critical transition in the form of a rapidly evolving scientific debate regarding whether or not currently proposed theories can be assessed for their scientific validity. At the forefront of this debate is Integrated Information Theory (IIT), widely regarded as the preeminent theory of consciousness because it quantified...

Formalizing Falsification for Theories of Consciousness Across Computational Hierarchies

arXiv Preprint Archive June 12, 2020 Jake R. Hanson, Sara I. Walker

The scientific study of consciousness is currently undergoing a critical transition in the form of a rapidly evolving scientific debate regarding whether or not currently proposed theories can be assessed for their scientific validity. At the forefront of this debate is Integrated Information Theory (IIT), widely regarded as the preeminent theory of consciousness because of its quantification...

Integrated Information Theory and Isomorphic Feed-Forward Philosophical Zombies

arXiv Preprint Archive August 3, 2019 Jake R. Hanson, Sara I. Walker

Any theory amenable to scientific inquiry must have testable consequences. This minimal criterion is uniquely challenging for the study of consciousness, as we do not know if it is possible to confirm via observation from the outside whether or not a physical system knows what it feels like to have an inside - a challenge referred to as the "hard problem" of consciousness. To arrive at a theory...