Abstract Mental health practitioners—users of services and carers, nurses, general practitioners, psychiatrists, psychologists, etc.—claim a spe- cial expertise in the mental. The philosophy of mind should thus be, uniquely, their philosophy. Conversely, mental health practice, given the remarkable range of abnormal mental phenomena with which it is concerned, should be uniquely interesting to...
Abstract The story I shall tell is a piece of autobiography. But it is not, as you might sup pose, a record of my own mystical experiences. For I do not claim to have had any. It is rather a record of a thought process that led from a childhood interest in religion, through an adolescent interest in mystical experience as a psycho logical phenomenon, to the publication forty years ago in the...
Abstract Should we distinguish between access and phenomenal consciousness? Block says yes and that various pathologies of consciousness support and clarify the distinction. The commentary charge that the distinction is neither supported nor clarified by the clinical data. It recommends an alternative reading of the data and urges Block to clarify the distinction.