Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
July 7, 2010
Pierfrancesco Basile
33 citations
Abstract Although panpsychism has had a very long history, one that goes back to the very origin of western philosophy, its force has only recently been appreciated by analytic philosophers of mind. And even if many still reject the theory as utterly absurd, others have argued that it is the only genuine form of physicalism. This paper examines the case for panpsychism and argues that there are...
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
July 7, 2010
Leemon B. McHenry
3 citations
Abstract Timothy Sprigge advanced an original synthesis of panpsychism and absolute idealism. He argued that consciousness is an irreducible, subjective reality that is only grasped by an introspective, phenomenological approach and constructed his ontology from what is revealed in the phenomenology. In defending the unique place of metaphysics in the pursuit of truth, he claimed that...
Journal of Humanistic Psychology
July 6, 2010
Eugene Taylor
39 citations
William James anticipated that his views on a science of consciousness would have an impact even decades after he had passed away in 1910. His evolving model of consciousness is reviewed as it developed between the 1860s and the early 1900s. As a result of these investigations, James developed a metaphysics of pragmatism, pluralism, and radical empiricism to answer the question of how waking...
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies
July 1, 2010
Anette Kjellgren, Anders Eriksson
20 citations
This study investigated the experiences gained from a 20-minute shamanic-like drumming session. Twenty-two persons participated and made written descriptions afterwards about their experiences. A phenomenological analysis was applied which generated 31 categories, that were organized into six themes: 1) The undertaking of the drumming journey, 2) Perceptual phenomena: visual, auditory and...
International Journal of Yoga
July 1, 2010
Sanjay Kumar, Hr Nagendra, Kv Naveen et al.
Practicing mental repetition of "OM" has been shown to cause significant changes in the middle latency auditory-evoked potentials, which suggests that it facilitates the neural activity at the mesencephalic or diencephalic levels. The aim of the study was to study the brainstem auditory-evoked potentials (BAEP) in two meditation states based on consciousness, viz. dharana, and dhyana. Thirty...
Existential Analysis: Journal of the Society for Existential Analysis
July 1, 2010
Jyoti Nanda
In an earlier paper (Nanda, 2009), I put forth the argument that the practice of mindfulness gives rise to existential-phenomenological themes and that both practices of Mindfulness and Existential therapy have many parallels. This paper explores how existential-phenomenological themes inevitably arise in Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT), one of the models of 'third wave CBT' when it...
Topics in Cognitive Science
July 1, 2010
William Bechtel
Although philosophy has been only a minor contributor to cognitive science to date, this paper describes two projects in naturalistic philosophy of mind and one in naturalistic philosophy of science that have been pursued during the past 30 years and that can make theoretical and methodological contributions to cognitive science. First, stances on the mind-body problem (identity theory,...
American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis
July 1, 2010
Graham F. Wagstaff
21 citations
In the first of two recent papers, Pekala, Kumar, Maurer, Elliot-Carter, Moon and Mullen (2010a) review what they consider to be the relationships between trance or altered state effects, suggestibility, and expectancy, and how they relate to the concepts of hypnosis and hypnotism. They also suggest that these concepts can be assessed with an instrument they term the PCI-HAP (Phenomenology of...
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
July 1, 2010
Sid Kouider, Vincent De Gardelle, Jérôme Sackur et al.
477 citations
Current theories of consciousness posit a dissociation between 'phenomenal' consciousness (rich) and 'access' consciousness (limited). Here, we argue that the empirical evidence for phenomenal consciousness without access is equivocal, resulting either from a confusion between phenomenal and unconscious contents, or from an impression of phenomenally rich experiences arising from illusory...
Symmetry
June 25, 2010
Roger Vergauwen
Within recent discussions in the Philosophy of Mind, the nature of conscious phenomenal states or qualia (also called ‘raw feels’ or the feel of ‘what it is like to be’) has been an important focus of interest. Proponents of Mind-Body Type-Identity theories have claimed that mental states can be reduced to neurophysiological states of the brain. Others have denied that such a reduction is...