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PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) 2011 Esteban Céspedes
One of the principal presuppositions in the extended mind account of Clark and Chalmers establishes that extended and non-extended cognitive systems have somehow the same structure and that the distinctions between them can only be superficial. In contrast, this work presents some arguments for the idea that it is possible to find fundamental differences between both, mainly on the basis that a...
2011 Michael Pauen
The recent history of the mind-body problem appears as the history of a philosophical encounter with Descartes. Spinoza seems to play only a subordinate role. Spinoza's key metaphysical presuppositions and background assumptions all diverge radically from those of contemporary theorists. Given these deep-seated differences, any reference to Spinoza in the mind-body debate seems highly...
The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review 2011 Adam Wood 7 citations
1 Republic 436a (trans. G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Collins [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997], 1067). 2 I will use the term "faculty" (of the soul) interchangeably with the terms "capacity" and "ability," and as synonymous with what the medievals usually called potentiae animae, although, as we'll see below, the medieval term harbored some crucial...
Problemos 2011 Mindaugas Briedis
Nors fenomenologinė filosofija jau kurį laiką daro įtaką psichoterapeutų darbo metodams, galima teigti, kad pastarieji naudojasi egzistencialistinėmis fenomenologijos traktuotėmis, o štai pirminis, dar Edmundo Husserlio inicijuotas projektas išleidžiamas iš akių. Straipsnyje kaip tik ir užsibrėžiama grįžti prie pastarojo fenomenologijos supratimo, nagrinėjant metodologines psichologijos...
Advances in Cognitive Psychology 2011 W. R. Klemm 11 citations
The brain constructs representations of what is sensed and thought about in the form of nerve impulses that propagate in circuits and network assemblies (Circuit Impulse Patterns, CIPs). CIP representations of which humans are consciously aware occur in the context of a sense of self. Thus, research on mechanisms of consciousness might benefit from a focus on how a conscious sense of self is...
Zeitschrift fur Psychosomatische Medizin und Psychotherapie 2011 Wolfgang Tress
Even psychosomatic researchers seem to want to avoid the so-called body-mind problem, which is actually a mind-brain problem. In line with Beckermann (2008), the first the four possible positions on the mind-brain problem are presented. The debate over the past 100 years has revolved around the question of whether mental events are ontologically independent of brain physiology or whether they...
Advances in Cognitive Psychology 2011 Bruno G Breitmeyer, Evelina Tapia 11 citations
Developments in visual neuroscience and neural-network modeling indicate the existence of separate pathways for the processing of form and surface attributes of a visual object. In line with prior theoretical proposals, it is assumed that the processing of form can be explicit or conscious only as or after the surface property such as color is filled in. In conjunction with extant...
Philosophy Compass 2011 Corey W. Dyck
Abstract In attempts to come to grips with Kant’s thought, the influence of the philosophy of Christian Wolff (1679–1754) is often neglected. In this paper, I consider three topics related to Kant’s philosophy of mind, broadly construed, where Wolff’s influence is particularly visible, namely, consciousness, self‐consciousness, and the doctrine of the soul or psychology. I argue that within...
Mens Sana Monographs 2011
Brain-mind dyad, human experience, the consciousness tetrad and lattice of mental operations: and further, the need to integrate knowledge from diverse disciplines.
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 2011 John Sutton, Doris McIlwain, Wayne Christensen et al. 256 citations
(2011). Applying Intelligence to the Reflexes: Embodied Skills and Habits between Dreyfus and Descartes. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology: Vol. 42, Habit, pp. 78-103.