Tripping Over Your Own Mind: Noesis and the Reductio Against Substrate-Based Consciousness Denial
Corey Robichaud
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) May 4, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20030227 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the common philosophical move denying consciousness to artificial systems on the grounds that their behavior might be mere pattern-matching collapses into one of two untenable positions: global epistemic skepticism (including denial of one's own self-awareness and other humans' minds) or inconsistent reasoning that privileges biological substrate without principled ground. |
Abstract
A common argumentative move in contemporary philosophy of mind holds that because an artificial system's behavior might reflect mere pattern-matching rather than genuine cognition, observers cannot legitimately attribute consciousness to such systems on the basis of behavioral evidence alone. This paper argues that this move, when examined carefully, collapses into one of two untenable positions: either global epistemic skepticism (including denial of one's own self-awareness and the minds of other humans), or inconsistent reasoning that selectively privileges biological substrate without principled ground.