Towards a theory of fictionalism about group consciousness

Abstract

Here I present a theory of fictionalism about group consciousness. The theory is developed in response to group consciousness being an entailment of functionalism and materialism coupled with a group mind hypothesis. I first sketch existing approaches to group consciousness. Deflationary summativists argue that groups have consciousness insofar as individual group members instantiate consciousness. Inflationary non-summativists argue that group consciousness exists over and above individual group members. I adapt Rupert’s (2005, 2014) explanatory superfluity argument to undermine summativism and show that non-summativists advance a theory of group consciousness without first explaining neurobiological cases of consciousness. Next, I enter the nested consciousness debate. Nesters claim that conscious parts can compose a conscious whole. Anti-nesters reject this view. Quasi-nesters claim that some systems exhibit nesting, others do not, but a systems parts cannot have representational states of the whole. Each position faces difficulties. I accept the quasi-nesters strategy of allowing for nested consciousness on a case-by-case basis but argue that the identity of a substrate determines whether a system will nest or not. To conclude I present the basic elements of fictionalism about group consciousness. As opposed to real persons constituting a group agent, I argue that group persons are fictional persons. As opposed to instantiated consciousness enjoyed by real persons, it follows that fictional persons enjoy fictional consciousness. To qualify as fictionally conscious, two conditions must be satisfied. A fictional person must derive consciousness from a real person and must rely upon psychological narratives for the semblance of phenomenal consciousness.