Different Modalities
Oxford University Press eBooks October 10, 1996 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236801.003.0005 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that a general theory of sensory modalities could be built around "objective phenomenology," an account of the structural features of perception that would let those lacking a given experience understand what it is like. Proposes that completing a "quality space" for a modality, generated by relative similarities, captures these structural features, illustrated through examples such as the psychological colour solid, spatial qualia, chords, and shapes. |
Abstract
One would like a general theory of sensory modalities, a theory that could be applied to any sensory modality, including ones that humans do not share. It could be applied not only to the familiar human sensory modalities, but also to non-human ones such as electro-reception and echo location. In Nagel's words, one would like an objective characterization of the subjective character of a sensory modality, one that would in some sense enable creatures who do not have a particular kind of experience to understand what it is like to have that kind of experience. This ‘objective phenomenology’ would describe the structural features of perception. Completing a quality space for a sensory modality satisfies some of these desires. That space precisely describes the modality's ‘structural features’, which are generated by relative similarities. This chapter describes some examples of quality spaces, including the psychological colour solid. Spatial qualia, chords, and shapes are also discussed.