Consciousness, intrinsic intentionality, and self-understanding machines
Oxford University Press eBooks March 12, 1992 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198522379.003.0004 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 17 |
| Key points | Proposes that intrinsic intentionality depends on a system understanding that its processed symbols have their semantic content, with semantic self-understanding varying in degree and hypothesized to be greatest for symbols entering subjective experience. The author leaves open whether conscious subjective experience is necessary for high semantic self-understanding, a question with implications for functionalism and for AI, psychology, and neuroscience. |
Abstract
This chapter offers a clear and careful exploration of what it is to have an intentional state and the relationship of intentionality to subjective experience. Here, the chapter proposes that intrinsic intentionality depends on a system understanding that the symbols it processes have the semantic content that they have. Semantic self-understanding varies in degree, but is hypothesized to be greatest in the case of symbols which enter into subjective experience. It is deliberately left an open question whether conscious subjective experience is a necessary condition for a high degree of semantic self-understanding (which might provide a problem for functionalism). This issue has implications both for the relationship of artificial intelligence, psychology and neuroscience, and also for how psychologists of perception and language treat their domains of study. Relatively little attention is paid in mainstream psychology to the representational aspects of information and how this is dealt with in processing mechanisms.