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Consciousness: perspectives from symbolic and connectionist AI.

W Bechtel

Neuropsychologia September 1995 DOI: 10.1016/0028-3932(95)00049-9 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed
Key points The paper explores how far connectionist computational models can account for three aspects of conscious mental states: intrinsic intentionality, awareness of intentional contents, and qualitative character. It describes and evaluates strategies for developing connectionist systems that satisfy these aspects, without stating a settled conclusion in the abstract.

Abstract

While consciousness has not been a major concern of most AI researchers, some theorists have tried to explore how computational models might explain consciousness. I explore how far computational models might go in explaining consciousness, focusing on three aspects of conscious mental states: their intrinsic intentionality, the awareness a subject has of the contents of these intentional states, and the distinctive qualitative character of these states. I describe and evaluate strategies for developing connectionist systems that satisfy these aspects of consciousness.