Consciousness: perspectives from symbolic and connectionist AI.
W Bechtel
Neuropsychologia September 1995 DOI: 10.1016/0028-3932(95)00049-9 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | The paper explores how far connectionist computational models can account for three aspects of conscious mental states: intrinsic intentionality, awareness of intentional contents, and qualitative character. It describes and evaluates strategies for developing connectionist systems that satisfy these aspects, without stating a settled conclusion in the abstract. |
Abstract
While consciousness has not been a major concern of most AI researchers, some theorists have tried to explore how computational models might explain consciousness. I explore how far computational models might go in explaining consciousness, focusing on three aspects of conscious mental states: their intrinsic intentionality, the awareness a subject has of the contents of these intentional states, and the distinctive qualitative character of these states. I describe and evaluate strategies for developing connectionist systems that satisfy these aspects of consciousness.
Citations in the library
Cited by 2
Cites 4
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- Tertium datur?Reflections on Owen Flanagan'sconsciousness reconsidered Philosophical Psychology 1995
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- Consciousness, explanatory inversion, and cognitive science Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 1990