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Raw Feeling and the Intelligibility Gap

Robert Kirk

Oxford University Press eBooks October 24, 1996 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236795.003.0001 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that the notion of "raw feeling" is sound and that the "intelligibility gap" concerning consciousness can be closed by proposed solutions that require no leaps of faith. The author anticipates opposition both from those who doubt the solutions can accommodate their intuitions and from behaviourists, verificationists, Wittgensteinians, and eliminativists who reject that a problem about consciousness exists.

Abstract

This chapter seeks to justify the contention that the notion of raw feeling is sound. It also makes clear what the intelligibility gap is. Another aim — the main one — is to develop solutions to the real problems, thereby showing how the intelligibility gap can be closed. The third aim is to make clear that the proposed solutions are solutions — to show that they require no leaps of faith. Resistance is likely from opposite directions. On one side are those who stick by the intuitions and find it hard to conceive how they could possibly be provided for by the means that will be employed. On the other side stand behaviourists, verificationists, Wittgensteinians, and eliminativists who reject the contention that there is a problem about consciousness.

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