Mainstream Consciousness Discourse as Lexical Disambiguation Failure
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) October 31, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23847990 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that apparent disagreements about consciousness can arise from lexical equivocation or invalid transfer of properties when discussions shift among different targets of the term without notice. Proposes a structured representation and classification scheme to distinguish well-formed, underspecified, equivocal, mapped, substantively disputed, and empirically unresolved claims, while cautioning that disambiguation does not itself resolve consciousness or eliminate genuine theoretical conflict. |
Abstract
The term consciousness is used for partially overlapping targets: subjective experience, wakeful state, cognitive access, reportability, metacognition, functional organization, self-modeling, and forms of meaning or stake participation. When a discussion shifts among these targets without notice, apparent disagreements can be produced by lexical equivocation or invalid transfer of properties across domains. This paper develops lexical disambiguation failure as a diagnostic hypothesis rather than a verdict on the field. It proposes that consciousness claims be represented through an explicit term, sense, target, domain, transformation set, invariant or predicate, operational indicator, evidence basis, and cross-domain mapping. Claims can then be classified as well-formed, underspecified, equivocal, mapped, substantively disputed, or empirically unresolved. Disambiguation does not solve consciousness, prove that distinct senses name distinct phenomena, or eliminate genuine theoretical conflict. It provides a procedure for locating which disagreement is lexical, which is methodological, which concerns evidence, and which survives after the participants share a target.