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The Study of Consciousness Is Mired in Complexities and Difficulties: Can They Be Resolved?

Jonathan Nash

Qeios September 29, 2024 DOI: 10.32388/sv6z7v.3 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Consciousness Cognitive psychology Cognitive science
Key points Argues that terminological confusion and lack of operational definitions impede progress in consciousness research, and proposes greater semantic clarity and a process-oriented view of consciousness.

Abstract

This paper explores several etymological, semantic, sociolinguistic, and methodological issues that have, in my opinion, impeded the progress of consciousness research and discourse; and I offer some suggestions that are hopefully worthy of consideration and further discussion. I review the historical and extant conflation of terms in the literature; a plethora of published definitions and types of consciousness; and I call for greater “semantic lucidity”. I critique the rationale underpinning the search for the neural correlates of consciousness; advocate for greater adherence to the requirements of an operational definition in research; and discuss the notion of consciousness as a ‘process’ versus the premise of consciousness as a tangible ‘thing’ that can somehow be found in a particular locus within the material substrate of the nervous system.