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Phenomenology of the person

Emmanuel Housset

Routledge eBooks October 29, 2026 DOI: 10.4324/9781042025640-21 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that while Husserl defines the person as a subject with an a priori capacity for reflection and autonomy, later phenomenology emphasizes affectivity, with the world revealing itself only to a person in tension between affection and reflection. Contends that the embodied person is central to contemporary phenomenology and that shame and patience are decisive affects for describing selfhood as a genesis.

Abstract

According to Husserl, the person is defined as a subject possessing an a priori capacity for reflection and autonomy. Phenomenology after Husserl has placed greater emphasis on the importance of affectivity in the constitution of the person. The world reveals itself only to a person caught in this tension between affection and reflection. History becomes the locus of an intuition of its interpersonal task. Every person is embodied, and in contemporary phenomenology, the body is the most central and most difficult phenomenon. As a result, the affects of shame and patience take on decisive significance in describing the selfhood of the person as a genesis.

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  • Argues that later phenomenology emphasizes affectivity and the embodied person, with shame and patience as decisive affects for describing selfhood as a genesis.

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