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Phenomenal Characters of Mental States and Emerging Issues in African Philosophy of Mind

Fasiku Gbenga, OR Taye

Thought and Practice October 26, 2011 DOI: 10.4314/tp.v3i1.70988 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Citations 1
Key points Argues that phenomenal properties of mental experiences are results of our epistemological perspectives of the world rather than ontological properties that are part of the world's fabric. Contends that African Philosophy of Mind must, from the outset, avoid metaphysical pitfalls by not treating phenomenal characters or properties of mental states as part of the fabric of the world.

Abstract

There is a prevalent assumption that the phenomenal character of a mental experience is an ontological property existing as part of the fabric of the world. This implies that the problem of explaining the phenomenal property of a mental experience is a metaphysical one. Contrary to this assumption, the present paper argues that phenomenal properties of mental experiences are the results of our epistemological perspectives of the world. Consequently, the paper contends that in developing issues for African Philosophy of Mind, care must, ab initio, be taken to avoid the metaphysical pitfalls of considering phenomenal characters or properties of mental states to be part of the fabric of the world.Key words. Consciousness, phenomenal property, mental experience, raw feels, qualia, Metaphysics, African Philosophy of Mind Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya (PAK)New Series, Vol.3 No.1, June 2011, pp.131-143

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