The Second-person Perspective on the First-person Plural
Bijoy H. Boruah
Routledge eBooks October 23, 2026 DOI: 10.4324/9781003612827-13 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the transition from first-person singular to first-person plural consciousness is not direct but mediated by the I-thou relation, in which the self encounters the other as another self. This communion, the author contends, yields a rudimentary experience of unity and constitutes the primitive form of we-ness that grounds more expansive forms of collective life. |
Abstract
The chapter takes up the ontological problem of we-sociality: how does the individual&s;s first-person singular sense of self give way to the first-person plural “we”? I argue that this gap is not bridged directly but mediated–by the phenomenological relation of I and thou. In this relation, the self encounters the other not as a foreign object but as another self, a mirror in which one&s;s own subjectivity is reflected back. This ontic intimacy does not merely resemble oneness; it virtually dissolves the boundary betwen two subjects of consciousness, yeiling a genuine, if rudimentary, expereince of unity. This I-thou communion constitutes the primitivie form of of we-ness itself, and it is this primitive form–not mere aggregation of individuals–that makes possible the more expansive, multitudinous forms of we-sociality that ground collective life. The I-thou intersubjectivity thus serves as a structurally mediating link between first-person singular and first-person plural consciousness.