Being one of us: we-identities and self-categorization theory.
Felipe León
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2026 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-023-09923-0 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Close personal relationships Depersonalization Self-categorization theory Socially extended mind We-identity |
| Key points | Argues that self-categorization theory's account of we-identities, built on uniformity, interchangeability, and prototypicality, cannot adequately explain the we-identities of close personal relationships, which are based on interpersonal interaction and integration through which individuals grasp their non-substitutability and complementarity. Proposes an alternative approach combining classical phenomenology with research on the socially extended mind. |
Abstract
One way to theorize about we-identities-the identities that individual subjects have as 'one of us'-is in terms of the uniformity, interchangeability, and prototypicality of group members. The social-psychological theory of self-categorization epitomizes this approach, which has strongly influenced contemporary phenomenological research on the we. This paper argues that this approach has one important and largely overlooked limitation: the we-identities tied to close personal relationships-exemplified by long-term friendships and romantic partnerships-are based on patterns of interpersonal interaction and integration through which individuals tend to grasp their non-substitutability and complementarity. This limitation suggests that another approach is needed to tackle the we-identities characteristic of close personal relationships. I outline such an approach, by combining resources from classical phenomenology and ongoing research on the socially extended mind.