A Mechanistic Account of Wide Computationalism.
Luke Kersten
Review of Philosophy and Psychology October 24, 2016 DOI: 10.1007/s13164-016-0322-3 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that wide computationalism—the view that some computational units are instantiated outside the individual—can overcome problems with its initial formulations by adopting a mechanistic conception of computation, and contends that cognitive science has overlooked this viable option in computational psychology. |
Abstract
The assumption that psychological states and processes are computational in character pervades much of cognitive science, what many call the computational theory of mind. In addition to occupying a central place in cognitive science, the computational theory of mind has also had a second life supporting "individualism", the view that psychological states should be taxonomized so as to supervene only on the intrinsic, physical properties of individuals. One response to individualism has been to raise the prospect of "wide computational systems", in which some computational units are instantiated outside the individual. "Wide computationalism" attempts to sever the link between individualism and computational psychology by enlarging the concept of computation. However, in spite of its potential interest to cognitive science, wide computationalism has received little attention in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. This paper aims to revisit the prospect of wide computationalism. It is argued that by appropriating a mechanistic conception of computation wide computationalism can overcome several issues that plague initial formulations. The aim is to show that cognitive science has overlooked an important and viable option in computational psychology. The paper marshals empirical support and responds to possible objections.