Neuroscience and everyday life: Facing the translation problem.
Jolien C. Francken, Marc Slors
Brain and Cognition February 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.bandc.2017.09.004 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Cognitive ontology Concepts Constructs Eliminativism Folk psychology Taxonomy |
| Key points | Argues that a 'translation problem' obstructs moving from neuroscience to common-sense use because neuroscientific terminology and common-sense concepts are hard to square, cognitive concepts are used unsystematically, and they map only indirectly and divergently onto brain activity. Proposes three strategies: new 'folk-neuroscience' concepts, scientific refinement and validation of existing concepts, and revision of application criteria for concepts like responsibility and consciousness. |
Abstract
To enable the impact of neuroscientific insights on our daily lives, careful translation of research findings is required. However, neuroscientific terminology and common-sense concepts are often hard to square. For example, when neuroscientists study lying to allow the use of brain scans for lie-detection purposes, the concept of lying in the scientific case differs considerably from the concept in court. Furthermore, lying and other cognitive concepts are used unsystematically and have an indirect and divergent mapping onto brain activity. Therefore, scientific findings cannot inform our practical concerns in a straightforward way. How then can neuroscience ultimately help determine if a defendant is legally responsible, or help someone understand their addiction better? Since the above-mentioned problems provide serious obstacles to move from science to common-sense, we call this the 'translation problem'. Here, we describe three promising approaches for neuroscience to face this translation problem. First, neuroscience could propose new 'folk-neuroscience' concepts, beyond the traditional folk-psychological array, which might inform and alter our phenomenology. Second, neuroscience can modify our current array of common-sense concepts by refining and validating scientific concepts. Third, neuroscience can change our views on the application criteria of concepts such as responsibility and consciousness. We believe that these strategies to deal with the translation problem should guide the practice of neuroscientific research to be able to contribute to our day-to-day life more effectively.
Comparable studies
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| From dopamine to salience to psychosis--linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. | 2005 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cites 6
- Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative State Science September 7, 2006
- The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 2013
- Neural resonance: Between implicit simulation and social perception Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences September 15, 2009
- The Illusion of Conscious Will The MIT Press September 20, 2018
- From commonsense to science, and back: the use of cognitive concepts in neuroscience. Consciousness and Cognition October 2014
and 1 more in the library