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Are Dreams Subjective Experiences (II)? The Phenomenology of Thinking and the Problem of Dream Belief

Jennifer Windt

Dreaming July 20, 2015 DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262028677.003.0009 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Citations 1
Key points Argues that hypotheses casting dreaming as a state of cognitive deficiency, with the phenomenology of a rational thinking self almost completely absent, are oversimplified. Proposes that dreaming in general, not just lucid dreaming, involves various forms of conscious thought and metacognitive activity, and that what is distinctive about dreaming is the close relationship between conscious thought and lower-level, automatically generated imagistic cognition.

Abstract

Chapter 9 proposes a conceptual framework for describing instances of thinking, self-reflection, and metacognition in dreams and analyzes their relationship to insight and control in lucid dreams. It also discusses the question of whether dreams involve beliefs. A preliminary result is that existing hypotheses that cast dreaming as a state of cognitive deficiency in which the phenomenology of being a rational, thinking self and cognitive agent is almost completely absent are oversimplified. Instead, dreaming in general, and not just lucid dreaming, involves various forms of conscious thought and metacognitive activity. What is interesting and unique about dreaming is not the absence of conscious thought but the close relationship in which it stands to lower-level, automatically generated imagistic cognition.

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