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Disturbance of Intentionality: A Phenomenological Study of Body-Affecting First-Rank Symptoms in Schizophrenia

Dusan Hirjak, Thiemo Breyer, Philipp Arthur Thomann, Thomas Fuchs

PLoS One September 3, 2013 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0073662 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Citations 47
Key points Proposes that the subjective experience of schizophrenia patients with body-affecting first-rank symptoms, specifically 'made' impulses and 'made' volitional acts, is rooted in a disturbance of intentionality and a diminished sense of agency. The authors argue this account offers insight into the interrelatedness between particular first-rank symptoms.

Abstract

Objectives: In 1950, Kurt Schneider proposed that a considerable number of schizophrenia patients develop first-rank symptoms (FRS). In such cases, patients report made experiences, replaced control of will, thought insertion, broadcast or withdrawal and delusional perception, respectively. Although a number of recent studies tend to explain FRS in terms of neurobiological and neuropsychological processes, the origin of these symptoms still remains unknown. In this paper, we explore the subjective experience of patients with the following two FRS: (1) "made" impulses and (2) "made" volitional acts.

Method: The method applied for the study of two FRS consists first in the overview of psychiatric and philosophical literature and second in the further investigation of subjective experience in patients with FRS. Psychopathological and phenomenological aspects of FRS are discussed by means of patient cases.

Results: We discovered a profound transformation of intentionality and agency in schizophrenia patients with body-affecting FRS. This concept offers an insight into the interrelatedness between particular FRS.

Conclusion: We propose that the subjective experience of schizophrenia patients with body-affecting FRS is rooted in the disturbance of intentionality and diminished sense of agency. This theoretical account of body-affecting FRS will open up new directions in both phenomenological and neurobiological psychiatric research.

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