Consciousness outside the brain

Abstract

The article examines the "Berkeleyan" approach to solving the psychophysical problem, according to which the only true reality is consciousness, and the entire perceived world, including the body and brain, exists only as subjective images within it. The author proposes a modified version of Berkeleyanism that avoids solipsism by introducing a transindividual sphere of consciousness—shared by all subjects and providing coherence to perception. Berkeley's main argument is the impossibility of conceiving of objects that transcend consciousness, as their concept makes no sense without corresponding experience. However, his concept is criticized for inconsistency: by denying material reality, he retains the transcendence of God and other consciousnesses. Sensory experience is recognized as private, while the intelligible (meaningful) component possesses an intersubjective status. In this model, the "generator of reality" is located within consciousness, creating correlated private worlds, which explains the collective illusion of an objective world. The study is based on an analysis of philosophical and neurophysiological research showing the inadequacy of the naturalistic approach to solving the psychophysical problem. Theories such as the dual-aspect approach, intuitionism, functionalism, and the informational approach are considered. Empirical results from "split-brain" studies, out-of-body experiences, and near-death experiences are utilized. The novelty of the work lies in the rejection of the materialist theories that assert consciousness is derived from the brain. The brain is viewed not as its source, but as an element of "daydreaming," necessary for maintaining the principle of causal closure of physical laws. This explains why brain damage affects consciousness: its function is to provide the appearance of causality in the perceived world. Arguments against naturalism are presented, including the inexplicability of qualia, the integrity, and individuality of consciousness from the perspectives of physics and neurophysiology. Alternative theories (dual-aspect approach, intuitionism, functionalism) are criticized for their inability to solve these problems. Evidence for "consciousness beyond the brain" is provided by phenomena related to out-of-body experiences and near-death experiences. The conclusion is drawn that Berkeleyan ontology offers a coherent solution to the "hard problem of consciousness" (according to D. Chalmers), avoiding the dead ends of materialism and dualism. It aligns with scientific data, explains paranormal phenomena, and opens new avenues for exploring the nature of consciousness.