Fenomenologia dell’esperienza virtualeUn approccio husserliano
Marco Cavallaro
Steiniana revista de estudios interdisciplinarios August 31, 2026 DOI: 10.7764/steiniana.11.1.2026.7 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that virtual experience is best understood, within a Husserlian phenomenological framework, as a "double perception." The author proposes and then rejects three alternative interpretations—image consciousness, imagination, and perceptual illusion—before defending the double-perception thesis. |
Abstract
This article examines virtual experience from a Husserlian phenomenological perspective. For Husserl, phenomenology is the intentional analysis of conscious experiences. The question that arises is therefore: what kind of experience is virtual experience? The article is experimental in nature in that it proposes a series of hypotheses to answer this question, which are gradually disproved by subsequent observations. The first hypothesis is that virtual experience can be identified with image consciousness. The second interprets virtual experience in terms of an act of imagination. The third proposes to interpret it as a perceptual illusion, while the fourth specifies this last hypothesis, justifying the main thesis of the article, according to which virtual experience is to be understood as a double perception.