Sense Experience and Poly-intentionality in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception
Journal of Speculative Philosophy September 6, 2019 DOI: 10.5325/jspecphil.33.3.0381 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues for a conception of poly-intentionality based on Merleau-Ponty's analysis of sense experience, proposing that sensations, grounded in the body's sense organs, accomplish a pre-reflective communication between body and world, and that affect and the notion of a material a priori help resolve problems about sensation's vagueness and unintelligibility. |
Abstract
abstract:This essay argues for a conception of poly-intentionality based on Merleau-Ponty's analysis of sense experience in his Phenomenology of Perception. I start by reviewing the tenuous status of sensation in Husserl's early work in order to prepare for a renewed conception of intentionality inspired by Merleau-Ponty—one that is grounded in the body's sense organs. I show how sensations accomplish a form of pre-reflective communication between the body and the world. Then, I explore how affect and the notion of a material a priori help resolve certain problems regarding sensation's alleged vagueness and unintelligibility. I conclude by advocating for Merleau-Ponty's notion of radical reflection and supplement it with insights gleaned from the analysis of poly-intentionality.