Naturalism of consciousness: A dialogue between Colin McGinn and Owen Flanagan
Obiora Anichebe, Onoja Christian Nnabuike
IKENGA International Journal of Institute of African Studies June 30, 2023 DOI: 10.53836/ijia/2023/24/2/008 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that constructive naturalism, as represented by Flanagan, is more plausible than McGinn's anti-constructive naturalism. The authors contend that McGinn's "hidden structure" of consciousness has weaknesses, that brain scanner technology has explanatory relevance for consciousness studies, and that science shows how the immaterial can emerge from matter, concluding that the science of consciousness makes naturalizing consciousness possible. |
Abstract
Opinions are divided among naturalists on whether we can specify any property of the brain as the basis of consciousness. This is the question of naturalism of consciousness. While constructive naturalists hold that naturalism is possible, anti-constructive naturalists don’t think so. Owen Flanagan falls within the former camp, while McGinn is an anti-constructive naturalist. In this study, we assess the contributions of McGinn and Flanagan with respect to the possibility of naturalising consciousness. The research demonstrates that constructive naturalism is more plausible than anti-constructive naturalism. We do this through the following routes: 1) highlighting the weaknesses in McGinn’s postulation of the “hidden structure” of consciousness; 2) projecting the explanatory relevance of Flanagan’s use of brain scanner technology in consciousness studies; and 3) demonstrating, on the basis of science, how the immaterial can emerge from matter. The paper concludes that through the science of consciousness, we can achieve possible naturalism of consciousness.