Neo-Naturalism, Conciliatory Explanations, and Spatiotemporal Surprises.
Frontiers in Psychology January 1, 2018 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02506 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA middle-ground position is argued: physics can explain why the explanatory gap between physical facts and conscious experience seems especially hard to close, even if it cannot provide a complete physical explanation of consciousness. This approach seeks empirical discoveries that weaken anti-physicalist arguments such as the conceivability argument and the knowledge argument. Recent developments in the physics of spacetime and information suggest such prospects are not poor. The view is framed as a naturalist theory of mind, but its reliance on new conceptions of time and information undermines traditional notions of concreteness and causation, requiring a radically reconfigured naturalism, or neo-naturalism.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Emergent spacetime Holographic principle Ignorance hypothesis Meta-problem |
| Key finding | Argues that recent advances in the physics of spacetime and information can diminish the power of anti-physicalist arguments about consciousness, though a full physical explanation of consciousness remains out of reach. |
Abstract
Some materialists believe that physics is rich enough to bridge Levine's Explanatory Gap, while others believe that it is not. Here I promote an intermediate position holding that physics is rich enough to explain why this gap seems more intractable than similar inter-theoretic explanatory gaps, without providing a full-blown "physical" explanation of consciousness. At a minimum, such an approach needs to explore the prospects of empirical discoveries that can diminish the power of anti-physicalist arguments like Chalmers's "conceivability argument" and Jackson's "knowledge argument." While this is not an easy task, recent advances in the physics of spacetime and information convince us that these prospects are not poor. The empirical bent of this approach suggests framing it as a naturalist theory of mind seeking to situate or make room for consciousness within our great naturalist system, but the reliance of this approach on recent (re)conceptions of time and information pulls the carpet out from under essential concepts like concreteness and causation, thus demanding a radically reconfigured naturalism, or neo-naturalism. The question that will frame this discussion is, "What could possibly count as an empirical fact that can help naturalize consciousness?"