Cognitive Phenomenology and Time
Steven Mclelland
August 21, 2026 DOI: 10.26686/63kr-xsfa (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Sample size | 1 |
| Population | One interview participant and the author via self-interview |
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that thinking has a non-sensory phenomenology composed of a series of second-order phenomenological senses, arising from the interaction between the intentional object and the intentional act. Contends that applying Lycan's first- and second-order distinction within Anderson's "Dynamic Phenomenology of Thinking" framework, examined through microphenomenological interviews, clarifies and lends verifiability to the cognitive phenomenology debate. |
Abstract
Cognitive Phenomenology’s central question asks is there something it is like to think, i.e. is there a phenomenological sense to the act of thinking. The inclusivist position holds there is something it is like to think while the exclusivists believe that there is not and so thinking should not be considered to have a phenomenology. A cognitive phenomenological sense, to be considered as such, must be non-sensory in nature lest it is to be considered a mistaken phenomenological sense of something else such as a mental representation. However, the way the act of thinking is discussed within this debate varies greatly which creates confusion and a lack of clarity as to what it is we are discussing when we discuss thinking. Thinking as a cognitive action appears to lack a standardized definition which has lead philosophers within the cognitive phenomenology debate to approach the action in many ways, many of which seem only to serve pre-existing biases. The question itself, I believe, is predicated on a sense of the word thinking which is mistaken. This thesis aims to explain the phenomenology of thinking as a non-sensory phenomenology which exists as not one phenomenological sense but a series of second-order phenomenological senses. By using William Lycan's distinction between first and second order phenomenological senses and applying it to a framework outlined by Fergus Anderson, the "Dynamic Phenomenology of Thinking" (DPT) framework. This thesis attempts to add verification to Anderson's framework by employing the Microphenomenological Method to outline the interactions between the intentional object and the intentional act throughout the process of thinking. Using the Microphenomenological interview method through an interview with a participant and a self-interview, as well as an example drawn from Anderson himself, this thesis queries the validity of Anderson's DPT thesis. I further argue that the interaction between the intentional object, or the object the act of thinking is focused on, and the act of thinking itself gives rise to the phenomenological senses of thinking. I argue that it is because of this interaction that we have any cognitive phenomenology which is non-sensory regardless of what the intentional object is. By employing the DPT framework the debate becomes centred upon a method which is verifiable and provides a clear meaning to what we are discussing when we talk about thinking. This also highlights how we cognitively interact with the subject of thinking and why the phenomenological sense that arises during thinking occurs in the manner it does.
Comparable studies
Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.
| Study | Year | Design | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. | 2003 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| From dopamine to salience to psychosis--linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. | 2005 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |