Is There a Specific Experience of Thinking?
Theoria August 16, 2014 DOI: 10.1387/theoria.640 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Cognitive experience Sensory experience Intentionality Phenomenal consciousness |
| Citations | 3 |
| Key points | Argues that there is a specific phenomenality for at least some thinking mental states, irreducible to sensory experience. |
Abstract
In this paper I discuss whether there is a specific experience of thinking or not. I address this question by analysing if it is possible to reduce the phenomenal character of thinking to the phenomenal character of sensory experiences. My purpose is to defend that there is a specific phenomenality for at least some thinking mental states. I present Husserl's theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations as a way to defend this claim and I consider its assumptions. Then I present the case of understanding as a paradigmatic case for the phenomenal contrast argument and I defend it against two objections.