Mac Kay's view of conscious agents in dialogue: Speculations on the embodiment of soul
Warren S. Brown
Philosophical Psychology December 1, 1997 DOI: 10.1080/09515089708573238 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that MacKay's non-reductive physicalism locates consciousness in self-evaluation arising from informational feedback about action, and that MacKay's analysis of dialogue as an environmental feedback loop can be extended through First and Second Order Theory of Mind. The author proposes that dialogue is critical to the instantiation of soul. |
Abstract
Donald MacKay's description of the embodiment of an efficacious conscious mind is reviewed as a version of non‐reductive physicalism. Particular focus is given to MacKay's analysis of the emergence of consciousness in the capacity for self‐evaluation which results from informational feedback regarding the results of action. Unique to MacKay's posthumously published Gifford Lectures is his analysis of agents in dialog as a particular form of an environmental feedback loop. His analysis of dialog is reviewed and expanded to encompass concepts of a First and Second Order Theory of Mind. Finally, MacKay's view of the status of the soul is considered, and the particular role of dialogue as critical to the instantiation of soul is suggested.